When a student skydiver is seriously injured on landing, the instinct to look skyward for someone to blame is understandable. But what happens when the expert evidence, the video footage, and two independent instructors all point to the student himself as the cause of his own injury? The Queensland Court of Appeal’s decision in Eyles v Sydney Skydivers Pty Ltd1 is a striking illustration of the causation trap that awaits plaintiffs who succeed in establishing breach but fail to connect that breach to their loss. The decision also provides useful guidance on the proper characterisation of inherent risk under the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) (‘CLA’) and the breadth of the ‘dangerous recreational activity’ defence.
Background
The appellant, James Eyles, was a qualified parachute packer and member of the Australian Parachute Federation who enrolled in an accelerated free-fall course with the respondent, Sydney Skydivers Pty Ltd, to pursue a career as a skydiving camera operator.
On 1 October 2016, the appellant completed two supervised solo jumps with instructor guidance via radio and hand signals. Both jumps were largely successful, though on the first occasion he was noted to have lost his balance on landing and gone down on one knee.2
The critical incident occurred on 30 October 2016 during a subsequent solo skydive at the respondent’s North Queensland aerodrome. He was accompanied by two instructors, with a third remaining on the ground as a target assistant who would direct his final approach using paddles.3 The appellant sustained spiral fractures to his right tibia and fibula during landing, having landed off the designated target area onto a loose gravel runway. While he claimed he landed with legs together and knees bent before his foot slipped on the uneven surface, the instructors and video evidence suggested he had extended his right leg toward the ground in violation of his training.4
Competing Versions of the Landing
The appellant’s pleaded case rested on several key contentions:
First, he alleged that after deploying his parachute, the two accompanying instructors continued to freefall, reaching the ground well before him.5 This left him under the direction and supervision of the instructors and a target assistant on the ground.
Second, the appellant contended the target assistant, using hand-held paddles, directed him to hold the parachute toggles high in preparation for flaring but failed to instruct him to fully flare the parachute until he was sufficiently close to the ground.6 This alleged failure in timing and direction, he argued, forced him to flare heavily at the last moment, resulting in the heavy landing that caused his injuries.
Third, the appellant maintained he had followed the target assistant’s instructions by pulling the toggles down heavily in a full flare, which resulted in the heavy landing and the subsequent twisting injury.7
There was a fundamental factual dispute about the manner of landing. The appellant testified he landed with proper technique but was undone by slipping on the gravel surface.8 The instructors, however, testified the appellant had extended his right leg toward the ground, contrary to training.9
A video recording of the landing was tendered but proved ambiguous, with both parties arguing it supported their respective accounts.10 Medical evidence from Dr Cook, the orthopaedic expert, established spiral fractures to both bones typically resulted from a twisting force.11 Such fractures could arise from uneven ground contact causing the foot to twist, though the exact mechanism would depend on various factors including the landing surface, footing stability, and parachute positioning.
Trial Decision
The District Court at Bowen (Lynham DCJ) delivered judgment on 4 September 2025.12 Her Honour found the appellant, whilst an honest witness, had given evidence about the landing process that was inconsistent with the preponderance of the evidence, including the instructor witnesses, the video footage, and Dr Cook’s expert evidence.13 Her Honour concluded the appellant had “reached out” with his right foot immediately before touchdown, contrary to his training.14
Against that factual backdrop, the primary judge identified the relevant risk of harm as the risk a student skydiver undertaking a solo skydive might land and sustain injury by reason of unwittingly landing short of the designated landing zone and encountering an unexpected hazard such as a gravelly surface.15
The respondent was found to have breached its duty of care by allowing the appellant to fly over the runway before directing his landing approach, contrary to its operational manual.16 However, Lynham DCJ held this breach did not cause the appellant’s injuries. The injury instead resulted from the appellant’s own incorrect landing technique, not the surface on which he landed.17
The court also rejected claims under sections 60 and 61 of the Australian Consumer Law, finding the injury resulted from the appellant’s own actions rather than failure in the respondent’s services.18
The primary judge further held that even if negligence were established, the respondent would not be liable under statutory defences in the CLA.19 The injury resulted from the materialisation of an inherent risk (section 16 of the CLA) and an obvious risk associated with the dangerous recreational activity of solo skydiving (section 19 of the CLA).20 The reasoning emphasised the real risk was not landing on gravel but landing incorrectly.
The Appeal
The appellant pursued four grounds of appeal:
Ground 1: Causation
The appellant did not challenge the primary judge’s factual finding about the landing. Instead, it was suggested the primary judge had erred in the “correct identification of the relevant risk of injury”, and, consequently, in the causation analysis.21 The argument drew on the principle of Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) v Dederer,22 as cited with approval in Tapp v Australian Bushmen’s Campdraft & Rodeo Association Ltd,23 that the assessment of breach of duty depends on the correct identification of the relevant risk.24
The submission was, in essence, that because the identified risk (landing short of the designated zone on a gravel surface) made no reference to the method of landing, the method of landing was therefore irrelevant to both the formulation of the risk and the cause of the injury.25
The Court of Appeal, in reasons delivered by Boddice JA (with whom Mullins P and Doyle JA agreed), rejected this reasoning emphatically. The uncontested factual finding the appellant had reached out with his right foot was central to the cause of the injury.26
Critically, the Court confirmed the factual finding as to the landing technique was consistent with Dr Cook’s medical evidence.27 There was no causal nexus between the respondent’s breach (permitting the appellant to fly over the runway in breach of its operations manual) and the injury.28 The Court found there was no error in the primary judge’s conclusion as to causation.29
Ground 2: Australian Consumer Law
At trial, the appellant had also pursued a claim under sections 60 and 61 of the Australian Consumer Law, being the guarantees of due care and skill and fitness for purpose. On appeal, counsel for the appellant properly conceded that if the causation ground failed, this ground also failed. The Court found it unnecessary to consider further.30
Ground 3: Inherent Risk
Ground 4: Dangerous Recreational Activity
The appellant argued skydiving for the purpose of future professional employment should not be characterised as a “dangerous recreational activity” under section 19 of the CLA, as he was undertaking the course primarily for vocational purposes rather than pure recreation.35
The Court acknowledged the identification of the ‘obvious risk’ in the context of section 19 of the CLA is, in principle, to be undertaken at the same level of generality as the identification of the relevant risk for the purposes of breach of duty.36 However, the Court found it unnecessary to resolve the theoretical question of the correct scope of dangerous recreational activity. The primary judge’s finding the appellant’s solo jump was at least, in part, engaged in for enjoyment and pleasure was neither glaringly improbable nor contrary to compelling inferences.37 A mixed motive, part vocational and part recreational, was sufficient to bring the activity within the scope of the provision.
Key Takeaways
Eyles is a useful decision for defendants in adventure sport and recreational activity litigation. While instructors clearly owe a duty of care to their students, the scope of that duty has limits. This decision establishes that once an instructor has provided adequate training to a competent student, liability typically ceases for poor execution or poor decision-making. The student’s choice not to apply that training effectively, or at all, essentially constitutes an intervening act sufficient to break the causal chain between any instructional beach and subsequent injury.
For operators, the implications are significant but qualified. Compliance with established safety protocols and proper instruction methods provides substantial protection against liability claims, even where operational breaches occur elsewhere. The critical distinction lies between breach of duty and causation.
For injured participants, the evidentiary burden is considerable. Establishing operator liability requires demonstrating not merely that a breach occurred, but that the defendant’s specific breach directly caused the plaintiff’s injury. Furthermore, statutory defences under the CLA create formidable barriers to recovery in adventure activity contents.
The broader trajectory of appellate reasoning suggests Australian courts will continue to recognise and enforce the principle that participants in dangerous recreational activities bear substantial responsibility for executing their training appropriately. As adventure sports and recreational risk activities continue to proliferate, this allocation of responsibility between operators and participants will likely become increasingly important in establishing the legal boundaries of instructor liability.
1 [2026] QCA 53 (‘Eyles’).
2 Ibid [8].
3 Ibid [9]-[11].
4 Ibid [11]-[14].
5 Ibid [11].
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid [12].
9 Ibid [13].
10 Ibid [14].
11 Ibid [15]-[17].
12 Eyles v Sydney Skydivers Pty Ltd (District Court at Bowen, Lynham DCJ, 4 September 2025, unreported).
13 Eyles (n 1) [19].
14 Ibid [20].
15 Ibid [21].
16 Ibid [22]-23].
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid [24].
19 Ibid [25].
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid [28].
22 (2007) 234 CLR 330 at 338-339 [18].
23 (2022) 273 CLR 454 at 489 [106] (‘Tapp’).
24 Eyles (n 1) [30].
25 Ibid [32].
26 Ibid [32]-[33].
27 Ibid [33]-[36].
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid [38].
30 Ibid [39].
31 Ibid [40].
32 Ibid [41].
33 Ibid [44].
34 Ibid [45]-[46].
35 Ibid [47].
36 Tapp 454 at 491 [112].
37 Eyles (n 1) [49]-[50].
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The material contained in this publication is in the nature of general comment only, and neither purports nor is intended to be advice on any particular matter. No reader should act on the basis of any matter contained in this publication without considering, and if necessary, taking appropriate professional advice upon their own particular circumstances.
